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JURISDICTION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Did the lower court err in dismissing Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce for lack of subject matter jurisdiction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review as cited by the Defendant with regard to subject matter 
jurisdiction has been correctly stated as a Correction of Error Standard. 
ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
The issue of subject matter jurisdiction was properly preserved by the Defendant. 
However, the trial court did not rule on the issue of personal jurisdiction and the same is not 
properly before the Court, despite Defendant's assertion to the contrary. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Did the lower court err in dismissing Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce for lack of personal jurisdiction? 
ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
The issue of personal jurisdiction was a defense raised in the Plaintiffs Answer to the 
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. However, Plaintiff s jurisdictional 
argument, which was adopted by the district court, both in briefing [R. 42 - 48] and in oral 
argument [R. 76 - 86] was limited to the question of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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The district court's decision was also limited to the question of subject matter jurisdiction. [R. 
83, lines 2 - 25] 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
Amend V 
No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or process, without due process of law. 
Amend XIV 
...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Article I §7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I §11 
All courts shall be open, ...and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-22a-2 
(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order 
of a court of the United States or of any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit 
in this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an appropriate act 
of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any district court in 
Utah. The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment 
of a district court of Utah. 
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is subject to 
the same procedures, defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, 
setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this state. 
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Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7) (g) (i) 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the 
time of the divorce. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen or resident of 
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at 
the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, 
having residing, in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding 
subsequent departure from the state; or the commission of this state of the act giving 
rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act, or 
occurrence over which the defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives rise to a 
paternity suite under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of 
establishing responsibility for child support. 
California Family Code $4822 
All duties of support, including the duty to pay arrearages, are enforceable by an action 
under this chapter, including a proceeding for civil contempt. The defense that the parties are 
immune to suit because of their relationship as husband and wife or parent and child is not 
available to the obligor. 
RULES: 
Rule 6-404. Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by the filing of a petition 
to modify in the original divorce action. Service of the petition and summons upon the opposing 
party shall be in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No request for a modification of any existing decree shall be raised by way of an 
order to show cause. 
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(2) The responding party shall serve the reply within twenty days after service of the 
petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. Upon filing of the certificate, 
the matter shall be referred to the domestic relations commissioner prior to trial, or in those 
districts where there is not a domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar. 
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a law and motion or order to show 
cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce which requested a 
modification of the amount of spousal support he was ordered to pay to the Plaintiff. The 
modification request was based upon an alleged material change in circumstances. The district 
court dismissed the Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce holding that the 
Utah court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Judgment of Dissolution and Order 
after Hearing because the California court retains jurisdiction for modification purposes even 
though the Plaintiff domesticated the California decree for enforcement purposes. 
II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A Judgment of Dissolution was entered on or about December 5, 1991 in the Superior 
Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino, which dissolved the marriage 
between the Plaintiff, Dorena Bankler, and the Defendant, Jack Bankler. The Judgment of 
Dissolution provided for spousal support for a period of 4 years. Plaintiff sought continuation 
of the spousal support beyond the original 4 year period for an additional 4 year period. After 
a hearing the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino entered 
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an "Order After Hearing" on or about April 2, 1996, which continued the spousal support for the 
requested additional 4 year period. 
Plaintiff domesticated the above California orders in the Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Washington County, State of Utah on or about July 18, 1996. Plaintiff also sought enforcement 
of the California orders through the district court in Washington County, State of Utah, by filing 
a Motion for Order to Show Cause and an Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order to Show 
Cause. An Order to Show Cause was issued and served upon the Defendant. The Order to Show 
Cause hearing was held on November 15, 1996, wherein the court found that the Defendant had 
willfully failed to pay his alimony obligation and therefore was in contempt and the order of the 
court was a sentence of 30 days in the Washington County Jail. However, the sentence was 
stayed for review on December 13, 1996, and the Defendant was provided the opportunity 
to purge himself of contempt by renewing the payment schedule ordered by the California court. 
At the review hearing held on December 13, 1996, the Court further continued the order to show 
cause without making any ruling on it and re-calendared the same to January 24, 1997. The 
parties stipulated to continuance of the Order to Show Cause without date at the January 24, 1997 
hearing. 
While the enforcement action was proceeding, the Defendant filed a Verified Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce on about November 15, 1996, and the same was served upon the 
Plaintiff while she attended the Order to Show Cause hearing on November 15, 1997. Plaintiff 
filed an Answer to the Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and raised the affirmative 




DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The parties briefed the jurisdictional issues to the district court in the modification action. 
Argument was heard on December 13, 1996, and the district court found that the court had no 
jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce and dismissed the Defendant's Verified Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce. 
Defendant, thereafter, filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff obtained a Judgment of Dissolution on December 5, 1991. [R. 1 - 7] The 
divorce decree incorporated the parties' agreement which awarded the Plaintiff $1,200 per month 
as spousal support for a period of 4 years, from October 1, 1991 to September 30, 1995. [R. 2, 
paragraph 1] The parties' agreement also provided that the court "maintained] jurisdiction over 
spoual [sic] support for an additional 4 years" at which time it was to forever terminate. [R. 2, 
paragraph 1] The parties' agreement further provided that the agreement would be "subject to 
and interpreted under the laws of the State of California." [R. 6, paragraph 17] 
Defendant paid the Plaintiff spousal support for the duration of the first 4 year period. 
On July 10, 1995 and again on August 9, 1995, Plaintiff filed and served upon the Defendant a 
Notice to Appear and Produce Documents. Defendant failed to appear and the Plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Compel on November 8, 1995. [R. 8] The Defendant failed to appear at the hearing 
on the Motion to Compel and the court entered a Notice of Ruling which required that the 
Defendant appear at a hearing on January 2, 1996. [R. 8 -10] 
The hearing was held on January 2, 1996, and the Defendant again failed to appear. The 
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Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino entered an Order after 
Hearing, [R. 11 - 13], which continued the spousal support in the amount of $1,200 per month 
from October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1999 [R. 11] and awarded the Plaintiff $3,000 in 
attorney's fees. [R. 12] Defendant has failed to pay the Plaintiff spousal support since 
September of 1995, with the exception of the $1,200 paid at the December 13, 1996 hearing to 
purge himself of contempt. Defendant failed to pay the attorney fees awarded pursuant to the 
Order after Hearing. 
Consistent with the provisions of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, the Plaintiff 
domesticated the Judgment of Dissolution, Notice of Ruling, and Order after Hearing, by filing 
exemplified copies of the same with the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County, State 
of Utah, on July 18, 1996. [R. 1-13] Plaintiff sought to enforce the California orders by filing 
a Motion for Order to Show Cause [R. 18 - 19] and an Affidavit in Support of Motion for Order 
to Show Cause [R. 20 - 21]. An Order to Show Cause was issued and served upon the 
Defendant [R. 22 - 24]. The initial hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held on November 
15, 1996. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant appeared with counsel. Following argument of 
counsel, wherein the Defendant was heard with respect to his allegations that a change of 
circumstances occurred thus excusing his failure to pay, [R. 67 - 69], the court found that the 
Defendant had willfully failed to pay his alimony obligation and therefore was in contempt and 
the order of the court was a sentence of 30 days in the Washington County Jail. [R. 72b1, lines 
11 - 18]]. However, the sentence was stayed for review on December 13, 1996, and the 
1Page 10 of the November 15, 1996 transcript was missed in the clerk's 
numbering of the record. Plaintiff's cites to said page will therefore be 
numbered 72b. Page 9 of said transcript was numbered 72 and page 11 of said 
transcript was numbered 73. 
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Defendant was provided the opportunity "to purge himself of contempt by renewing the payment 
schedule ordered by the California court." [R. 72b, line 25; 73, line 1] 
At the review hearing on December 13, 1996, the Defendant tendered to the Plaintiff 
$1,200 which was the first and last money Plaintiff has received from the Defendant since 
September, 1995. The district court purged the Defendant's contempt in light of the $1,200 
payment and continued the order to show cause hearing without making any further ruling. The 
order to show cause proceedings were continued until January 24, 1997. [R. 84, lines 17 - 19]. 
The parties stipulated to continuance of the Order to Show Cause without date at the January 24, 
1997 hearing. [R. 89, lines 20 - 22]. 
While the events of the Order to Show Cause were proceeding, the Defendant filed a 
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on or about November 15, 1996, [R. 28], and the 
same was served upon the Plaintiff while she attended the Order to Show Cause hearing on 
November 15, 1997. Plaintiff raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at the November 15, 
1996 in the enforcement proceedings. The court requested briefing of the jurisdictional issues 
and the same were submitted by the parties. [R. 37 - 41, Defendant's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities with regard to Jurisdiction of a Foreign Decree] and [R. 42 - 48, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum] Argument was heard on December 13, 1996, and the district court found that it 
lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce and dismissed the Defendant's Verified 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce with prejudice. [R. 83, lines 4 -18] An order of dismissal 
was entered on or about January 24, 1997. [R. 54] 
Defendant, thereafter, filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. [R. 57] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is the position of the Plaintiff that a Utah court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 
modify a divorce decree of a California court. It is well settled in Utah that the court which 
originally hears the divorce proceeding retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders. This is especially true in a case such as the one at hand 
where the California court specifically retained jurisdiction over spousal support through 1999 
pursuant to the parties' agreement at which time spousal support would terminate permanently. 
Full faith and credit requires that the California orders are deemed res judicata in this forum. 
The Plaintiffs acts of domesticating the California orders, pursuant to the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act and subsequent enforcement proceedings, do not change the exclusive jurisdiction, 
as the rights and defenses preserved by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act are only those which the 
Defendant may constitutionally raise. Otherwise, there would be no finality to foreign judgments 
and forum shopping would be encouraged. 
The enforcement proceedings which the Plaintiff brought and the modification proceedings 
which the Defendant sought are not the same action. With regard to the Defendant's assertions 
and attempts to join the two proceedings into one, the Defendant had and continues to have the 
opportunity to be fully heard as to why he could not pay the spousal support payments that he 
has failed and refused to make and which the Plaintiff sought to be enforced. Defendant also 
had and continues to have a forum, in California, wherein he can modify his divorce decree 
should he choose to do so. Defendant was not denied access to the courts nor denied due process 
or equal protection. 
The district court did not decide the issue of personal jurisdiction and therefore whether 
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or not personal jurisdiction is not properly before this court. However, if the issue is before this 




SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
It is well settled that the court which originally hears proceedings involving a divorce 
action retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
in the matter. Utah has codified said rule in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) which states in 
relevant part that the court "has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new 
orders regarding alimony". Guidance is also provided by Rule 6-404, Code of Judicial 
Administration. Rule 6-404 provides in part that "[proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall 
be commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the original divorce action". 
In the case at hand the California court specifically retained jurisdiction over the spousal 
support issue for the eight years. The parties' agreement as incorporated into the Judgment of 
Dissolution after providing for an initial 4 year period of spousal support sets forth that "[t]he 
court shall maintain jurisdiction over spoual [sic] support for an additional 4 years at which time 
it shall forever terminate and the court shall lose jurisdiction." [R. 2, paragraph 1] In 
Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (1992), the Wife petitioned the Third Judicial 
District court for modification of a divorce decree despite the initial proceeding being in the Fifth 
Judicial District court. The Third Judicial District denied the Husband's motion for dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In reversing the Third Judicial District court's decision, the 
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Court of Appeals indicated that: 
A party can no more ask a different court to modify a divorce decree already entered than 
it can ask a different court for a new trial in a case otherwise concluded. To hold 
otherwise would do great mischief to orderly judicial process and would encourage forum 
shopping. 
Rimensburger, at 710. The Court further stated that "the court issuing the original decree retains 
exclusive jurisdiction to modify its decrees" and a party "wishing to modify a decree must do so 
in the original forum." Id 
In the case of Angel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405 (Utah 1982) (per curiam), 
a petition to modify a foreign decree, Nevada, was filed by Angel's ex-husband. Angel filed a 
motion to change venue which was denied by the lower court. Angel sought an extraordinary 
writ in the nature of Mandamus to compel the lower court to change venue. In dicta the Court 
recognized the position taken by the Plaintiff in these proceedings, that an action to modify a 
divorce decree should "properly be brought in the forum which issued the decree." Angel at 406 
-407. 
Defendant contends that two states may have simultaneous concurrent jurisdiction and that 
the Utah court should take concurrent jurisdiction in this matter and allow his petition to modify 
to proceed. Defendant cites the case of Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) 
to support his position. The Holm case provides no support for the position of the Defendant in 
this matter. Holm dealt with jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA), codified at 78-45c-l et seq, wherein simultaneous concurrent jurisdiction in child 
custody cases is specifically provided for. How Holm and the UCCJA have any relevance in 
these proceedings and the issue before this court, i.e. subject matter jurisdiction of the spousal 
support provisions of a domesticated foreign decree, are unclear to the Plaintiff. 
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In this matter the original decree and subsequent ruling after hearing, which the Plaintiff 
domesticated for enforcement purposes, were issued by the California court. The parties agreed 
that the California court would retain jurisdiction over spousal support for an 8 year period. That 
forum continues to be available to the Defendant to modify the decree should the Defendant 
choose to do so. Neither the Defendant's relocating to Utah, nor the Plaintiffs domestication of 
the California decree for enforcement proceedings alters the res judicata effect of said orders nor 
the continuing and exclusive jurisdiction of the original issuing court to modify said decree. 
II. 
UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT 
Plaintiff domesticated the California orders in the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions 
of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, §78-22a-2, Utah Code Ann. Plaintiff also proceeded in the 
lower court to enforce said California orders by seeking civil contempt and attorney's fees. 
Defendant's reliance on the Plaintiffs domestication and enforcement of the California orders 
to confer subject matter jurisdiction to pursue modification of the California orders is misplaced. 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act states in relevant part: 
A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is subject to the same 
procedures, defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, 
setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this state. 
Section 78-22a-2(3). Therefore, the Defendant can defend, enforce, satisfy, reopen, vacate, set 
aside, or stay the judgment. However, noticeably lacking in the specific language of the Act is 
the ability to modify the foreign judgment. Defendant's attempt to claim that his petition to 
modify is really "reopening" and therefore allowed by the clear language of the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act is disingenuous at best. Modification is one thing and re-opening another. 
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Defendant cites no rt his position. If the legislative body wanted to include the 
ability to modify a foreign decree, it clearh l ] ver, such 
a provision would be contrary to the full faith and credit that is to be afforded final judgments 
from our sister states. 
T
~ *
u? case of Data Management Systems. Inc. v. EDP Corp.. 709 P.2d 377 (Utah 1985), 
the Court w.» '**. , u<_. ^lament Act gives authority to the local 
state courts to reopen, vacate or set aside a judgment. The Court stated 1h.it thr I 'tjili Fnirirn 
. „w^.. ,«. courts: 
to reopen, reexamine, or alter a foreign judgment dul> : ; *:i uu^ > * -i^ cnt as g 
of fraud or the lack of jurisdiction or due process in the rendern ^ >t.ue. Onl e 
defenses may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit owed to the foreign juw&***w*t 
sought *< h'5 ."»t*.xr .. ..« i«- +]1C Foreign ! *•< "UMits Aei 
(Citations omitted) Id., at 381. The Court proceeded to state r t 
affc roreign judgments and would be contrary to the constitutional mandate.1' 
Id 
Because there has been no claim by the Defendant that his constitutional rights were 
violated by the entr l '" uu. *:-; wicait and are res judicata. 
As set forth above, nn»u»r- oi the California decree is available to the Defendant i 
original fom* ttci jurisdiction remains. Plaintiffs forced actions 
of dome^ d enforcirm the California decree are not tantamount u ec^ M-m 
. hese parties agreed that the California court: would retain 
jurisdiction over spousal support for 8 years. 
IMaintitt did not seek additional affirmative relief r. Utah that was not already available 
to her in California. California Fan > \ deles that . w.> oi support, 
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including the duty to pay arrearages, are enforceable . . . including a proceeding for civil 
contempt." Section 4822, Cal. Fam. Code. Therefore, Plaintiffs actions to enforce the spousal 
support award by an action for civil contempt should not subject her California order to 
modification here in a Utah court absent some authority to the contrary. Defendant has provided 
no such authority. 
ra
-
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
Defendant argues that under both the Constitution of the United States and of Utah that 
dismissal of his Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce denied him his rights to due 
process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities. The lower court's dismissal of the 
Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce has nothing to do with the 
Defendant's due process, equal protection, or privileges and immunities claims. 
In Holm, supra, the court addressed a due process argument and stated that: 
The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and 
demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved. One of the 
fundamental requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard. 
(Citations omitted) Id, at 164. Therefore, fundamental to due process is one's right to have her 
day in court. 
If the Plaintiff understands the Defendant's position correctly, the Defendant is claiming 
that his constitutional rights of due process as set forth in Article I §7, Utah Constitution, and the 
V and XIV amendments to the United States Constitution were denied when his Verified Petition 
to Modify Decree of Divorce was dismissed. Defendant contends that the dismissal subjected him 
to the loss of liberty, the 30 day jail sentence, and property, alimony and attorneys fees, which 
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were V sn > . \c enforcement proceedings, The Defendant had and will 
continue h- n • ,• hi- "day in court" in the enforcement 
-^ree separate occasions (l - Movembet 'L^ December . J , .JVo, m^ 
January 24. 1997,.
 L k. o*t - yi i i; f ? > * rce proceedings and based 
upon the Defendant's proffer regarding his inability to pay the spousal support and the tender of 
what amounts to day sentence was stayed pending 
further hearing and the disnct court is going u .^ai re a substantial showing <»i<l '.nhsi-nm I 
i \i - ...iiicial circumstances if the Plaintiff elects to pin -<M '-.; *• 
1 Ms* v Cause and conte—r„ [R. 84, lines 8 - IUJ iu c *- been 
i ..Hit's sentence, the Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees or entry of a 
judgment for the spousal support arrears, II i uti ui-rmr-Ml |»nardiiigj>liave been continued until 
further notice of either party, [R 89, lines 20 - 22] 
The Defendant' lah or the same reason the 
due process claim fails Defendant had his dav in court in the enforcem.*r
 : . 
Thos* oiiunucc u... ther notice of either party. ' • I 
treatment has resulted especially based upon out-of-state residt*n< ,' i li'111 I 'VietuLtiK r i K si dent 
I i h i s s l . i l e . 
IV. 
PERSONAL JURISDICHON 
The lower court did not in,ik< ;i ill i i IHIIII Im INSUC m) pn ,i I | I lion and therefore 
(lie Plaintiff does not respond to the Defendant's argument regarding the same as set fo* 
15 subp;iragr<u - .» >. i .~. however, if an analysis is undertaken, il would 
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involve the long arm statute, §78-27-24, Utah Code Ann., and a minimum contacts analysis 
similar to that set forth in Anderson v. Am. Soc. of Plastic Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990); 
cert, denied. 502 U.S. 900, 112 S.Ct. 276, 116 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant had his "day in court" in the enforcement proceedings and therefore there 
is no due process or equal protection issues. The Defendant also had an opportunity to be heard 
in California to contest the continuation of spousal support for the second 4 year period. That 
forum was chosen by the parties to retain the exclusive jurisdiction of the spousal support issue 
through September of 1999 at which time jurisdiction terminates. No concurrent jurisdiction lies 
due to the UCCJA. Utah should give full faith and credit to the California orders. The mere 
domestication of the California orders and enforcement efforts under the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. The defenses available to the Defendant by virtue 
of the domestication are those that are constitutional in nature. 
The issue of personal jurisdiction was not ruled upon by the district court and therefore 
not properly preserved. 
The district courts holding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to modify the California 
decree and subsequent order should be sustained on appeal. 
DATED this b day of October, 1997. 
RONALD L "READ, FOR 
HUGHES & READ 
2*> 
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I, KoiiiiLI I i HII MIIIIIMI lli^ l i iii Dv-Kihci <>, I 'W/, I served two copies of the attached 
Brief of Appellee upon R. Clayton Huntsman, the counsel 1»" • 11«• .n«|» n "> i i<i • hy 
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
R. Clayton Huntsman 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
283 West Hilton Drive, Suite 3 
St. George, UT 8477r 
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Attorney of Record 
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